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Discussion

Red Velhouse:

Let’s start with the immediate picture. The talks between the government and the ELN were suspended on January 17, 2025, after the group’s offensive against a FARC dissident organization in Catatumbo. That fighting killed people, displaced tens of thousands and fractured an already fragile peace strategy. Now, in August 2026, a new president is pursuing military pressure. Sam, does this amount to a return to the old Colombian war, or is that analogy too simple?

Sam Dewinski:

It is too simple if we imagine one national insurgency confronting the state as it did before the 2016 agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC. The current violence is more fragmented. The ELN, FARC dissidents and criminal organizations compete with one another for territory, communities and illicit income. The state is involved, of course, but many civilians are trapped in conflicts among armed groups. That makes this potentially wider, but not necessarily a replay of the past.

Kate Burvish:

And the geography matters economically. Catatumbo is not just a remote battlefield. It has agriculture, oil-related infrastructure, weak public services and a major coca economy. When armed groups control roads, markets and communities, they can tax legal commerce while also extracting income from illegal production. Displacing people therefore does more than create a humanitarian emergency. It destroys the local economic arrangements that families use to survive.

Ann Tofado:

Politically, the country has undergone a sharp reversal. Gustavo Petro’s “Total Peace” policy tried to negotiate with several armed groups at once. By 2026, many of those processes had stalled or collapsed, and President Abelardo de la Espriella took office after promising military offensive or submission to state authority. His incentive is to demonstrate control quickly. The ELN, meanwhile, has an incentive to show that it cannot simply be pressured out of the field.

Red Velhouse:

The most striking signal is from Chocó, where The Guardian interviewed a Western War Front commander using the name Yerson. He said his unit was ready to conduct offensive operations, potentially in cities or rural areas, if ELN leadership ordered it. Ann, how much weight should we put on that statement?

Ann Tofado:

A great deal as a warning, but not enough to call it a national order. This is a regional commander speaking in an interview. It shows confidence, preparation and willingness to threaten escalation. It does not prove that the central command has coordinated a countrywide offensive. The careful conclusion is cumulative: negotiations are frozen, territorial disputes are intensifying, military operations are increasing, and at least one important front is publicly presenting itself as ready for war.

Sam Dewinski:

That distinction is especially important with the ELN because it is more decentralized than the FARC was. A commander may have substantial room to act based on local pressures and financing. The organization has a national political structure, but its fronts operate in very different environments. Chocó, Catatumbo and Arauca do not present the same enemies or economic opportunities. Local escalation can therefore outrun national diplomacy.

Red Velhouse:

So could we be seeing not a centrally ordered national war, but the militarization of regional fronts?

Sam Dewinski:

That is the more defensible interpretation at this stage. But regional militarization can still become a national crisis. The ELN is Colombia’s longest-surviving major guerrilla movement, founded in 1964, and it has historically combined political claims with territorial control, extortion, kidnapping and attacks on infrastructure. Its history teaches us that negotiations and armed pressure often coexist. A breakdown in one region can harden attitudes across the organization.

Kate Burvish:

And the money makes that escalation durable. In Chocó, the commander described taxation of illegal mining, logging and commercial activity as central to the group’s finances. In Catatumbo, coca-related income is crucial, but not the only source of power. Control over an economy lets an armed group recruit, buy supplies and impose rules. That is why simply removing fighters from one location may not remove the incentives that sustain the conflict.

Ann Tofado:

This also complicates the government’s political messaging. A military operation can demonstrate resolve, but it may not produce lasting state authority if public services and legal economic opportunities remain absent. The administration can claim that it is confronting the problem rather than negotiating with it. Yet if operations produce civilian harm or displacement, the government’s legitimacy can suffer, particularly in communities already suspicious of Bogotá.

Red Velhouse:

Let’s examine that military strategy. On August 10, the government reported an operation in Norte de Santander that killed or neutralized two alleged ELN members and seized roughly one and a half tonnes of explosives and 440 drone-adapted grenades. The Defense Ministry denied civilian harm, while local officials and monitors reported injuries, damaged homes and displacement. What does this dispute tell us?

Ann Tofado:

It tells us that facts on the ground need independent verification, not just competing press statements. The official account establishes what the military says it did and seized. The civilian account raises serious questions about proportionality, precaution and the effect on residents. Those claims had not been independently resolved by August 19. If the government wants a durable military strategy, transparent investigations are not a luxury; they are part of maintaining legitimacy and compliance with international humanitarian law.

Kate Burvish:

The immediate economic cost of disputed operations is also local and concrete. People stop farming, trading and sending children to school. Health care becomes harder to reach. The state then spends more on emergency relief, troop deployments and reconstruction, while production and tax-generating commerce fall. There is no reliable basis for giving a precise national GDP forecast from this escalation. But we can say the burden is already shifting onto households and public budgets.

Red Velhouse:

Kate, you mentioned legal alternatives. The government has backed programs to move farmers toward legal production, including direct sales of farm goods. Can that realistically compete with coca income quickly enough to change armed-group recruitment?

Kate Burvish:

Not quickly, and probably not through markets alone. One program reported selling more than 40 tonnes of farm products and generating over 60 million Colombian pesos for more than 1,230 families. That is meaningful for participating households, but tiny compared with the scale of the regional economy and the armed groups’ ability to tax it. Legal substitution requires roads, security, buyers, credit and reliable state services. If coca income disappears before those systems exist, food insecurity may worsen and armed groups can become more coercive.

Sam Dewinski:

This is where the comparison with the 2016 FARC agreement can mislead. The agreement reduced the strength of Colombia’s largest insurgency, but territorial and economic vacuums remained. Other groups moved into some of those spaces. A settlement with the ELN would face a more decentralized organization and a landscape in which rival groups are ready to seize territory. Disarmament without local security and economic transition could simply rearrange who controls the population.

Ann Tofado:

And the political lesson is not that negotiation failed because negotiation is inherently naïve. The lesson may be that a ceasefire and a political process need enforcement, verification and a credible state presence. Petro’s broad framework created openings, but the breakdown in Catatumbo exposed how vulnerable talks were when armed groups pursued territorial gains. De la Espriella is now testing the opposite proposition: that pressure will force submission. Both approaches can fail if they do not change conditions in rural communities.

Red Velhouse:

Sam, is there a historical precedent for military pressure weakening the ELN, or does pressure usually fragment groups?

Sam Dewinski:

The history supports caution rather than a simple rule. The ELN has survived decades of military operations, leadership losses and failed negotiations. Pressure can reduce a group’s freedom of movement, but it can also encourage fronts to act independently, seek new revenue or ally temporarily with rivals. The 2016 FARC demobilization shows that a large armed organization can be brought into a settlement, but the post-agreement violence shows that empty territory is an invitation to another actor.

Kate Burvish:

Fragmentation is economically dangerous because it can multiply checkpoints and taxes. A single armed authority may be brutal, but several competing authorities can make trade even less predictable. Farmers, miners and transport operators pay repeatedly or stop operating. That is why a military success measured in weapons seized may not translate into economic security. We need to watch mobility, market access and household displacement, not only battlefield counts.

Ann Tofado:

There is also a cross-border dimension. Catatumbo borders Venezuela, and the ELN’s operating space is partly transnational. Fighting can push civilians across the border, shift illicit trade routes and create diplomatic tension. Claims about direct Venezuelan state support remain contested, so they should not be treated as settled fact. But the geography alone gives the ELN resilience and complicates any strategy based solely on Colombian territorial control.

Red Velhouse:

If we return six months from now, what would distinguish a genuine return to wider conflict from continued localized violence?

Sam Dewinski:

I would look for coordinated attacks across several regions, not just more fighting in existing hotspots. We would also need to see whether fronts follow common political instructions, whether attacks on infrastructure and urban targets become systematic, and whether the organization’s national leadership claims responsibility. A few alarming incidents would show danger, but not necessarily a nationwide campaign.

Kate Burvish:

I would add civilian and economic indicators: new mass displacement, prolonged confinement, interruptions to major transport or public services, and a sustained decline in farming and commerce. The International Committee of the Red Cross described 2025 as Colombia’s worst year for conflict-related humanitarian consequences in a decade, with hundreds of thousands displaced or confined nationally. Those totals involve several conflicts, so attribution matters—but worsening numbers would show that containment is failing.

Ann Tofado:

Politically, watch whether the government leaves room for a conditional return to talks. Renewed negotiations could require a ceasefire, or they might proceed alongside military operations, but either route needs credible monitoring. Also watch congressional and local responses to civilian casualties. If military pressure becomes identified with indiscriminate harm, it can weaken public support. If talks resume without restraints on armed groups, they can again look like permission to consolidate territory.

Red Velhouse:

So the central question is not simply whether the ELN is “back at war.” It is whether a decentralized movement, regional armed competition and a government eager to prove military control are creating a cycle that neither side can easily stop. Colombia has seen what happens when negotiations ignore territorial realities—and what happens when demobilization leaves communities exposed.

Red Velhouse:

The unresolved issue is whether the ELN’s regional preparations will become a coordinated national offensive, or remain a collection of local conflicts intensified by military pressure and economic competition. Worth watching are the pattern of attacks across regions, independent findings about civilian harm, displacement and confinement figures, the behavior of rival armed groups, and whether any credible channel for monitored negotiations reopens. Sources and references for this discussion are
available with the episode at Factolio.com.

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Sources and References

These sources supported the factual material used in this discussion. Factolio’s panel discussion is AI-generated from researched evidence and is written in original language.

1. Reuters — Colombia's president suspends peace talks with ELN rebels (NEWS)
2. SUIN-Juriscol / Colombian government — Resolution 16 of 2025 (PRIMARY)
3. Human Rights Watch — Colombia: Armed Groups Batter Border Region (ANALYSIS)
4. Human Rights Watch — Colombia: Grupos armados azotan región fronteriza (ANALYSIS)
5. Defensoría del Pueblo de Colombia — El Catatumbo padece la emergencia humanitaria más grande desde que hay registro en Colombia (PRIMARY)
6. International Committee of the Red Cross — Colombia 2025: A humanitarian crisis beyond numbers (PRIMARY)
7. International Committee of the Red Cross — ICRC report: Failure to respect rules of war deepened humanitarian crisis in Colombia in 2025 (PRIMARY)
8. The Guardian — Colombia on the brink: ELN guerrilla group prepares for return to war (NEWS)
9. Colombian National Army — The National Army destroyed an ELN cache containing nearly one ton of explosives in Norte de Santander (PRIMARY)
10. Colombian National Army — Blow to the ELN in Arauca: two suspects neutralized, six captured, and one minor rescued (PRIMARY)
11. Colombian National Army — Contundente golpe al ELN en el Catatumbo (PRIMARY)
12. El País América Colombia — Los primeros bombardeos de De la Espriella contra el ELN afectan a la población civil (NEWS)
13. Presidencia de Colombia — Presidencia de la República (PRIMARY)
14. Associated Press — A car-bomb attack targets southwest Colombia a day after conservative president takes office (NEWS)
15. United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia — Security Council report on Colombia (PRIMARY)
16. Banco de la República de Colombia — Myths and realities of Catatumbo (DATA)
17. Constitutional Court of Colombia — Judgment C-148 of 2025 (PRIMARY)
18. Presidencia de Colombia — Con apoyo de Naciones Unidas, Gobierno impulsa comercialización directa de productos agropecuarios en Catatumbo (PRIMARY)
19. Associated Press — Colombians flee to Venezuela as clashes between rebel groups escalate in coca-rich border region (NEWS)
20. International Committee of the Red Cross — The human cost of armed conflicts in Colombia (PRIMARY)
21. Associated Press — Colombia halts peace talks with ELN rebels and accuses them of war crimes in northeastern region (NEWS)