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Discussion

Sam Dewinski:

It began with federal indictments unsealed in January 2019, initially focused on alleged sanctions-related fraud and obstruction. A February 2020 superseding indictment widened the case, adding racketeering and trade-secret allegations involving Huawei and related entities. The government presents that expansion as evidence of an enterprise and pattern of conduct spanning affiliates, countries and technologies. Huawei’s position is that prosecutors are stitching together unrelated disputes and foreign activity.

Red Velhouse:

So this is not one allegation with a few supporting details. It is a theory that different kinds of conduct belong to one organization and one pattern. Why has it taken so long to reach a jury?

Sam Dewinski:

The case has involved extensive motions, discovery disputes, sensitive or classified-material questions, international witnesses and revisions to the charges. In 2024, the judge rejected Huawei’s effort to dismiss the broad indictment, but that ruling only allowed the prosecution to continue; it did not decide guilt. The delay reflects the case’s complexity, but it also creates a practical problem: jurors must reconstruct years of alleged conduct without letting the larger U.S.-China conflict fill gaps in the evidence.

Kate Burvish:

And the stakes accumulate during that delay. Prosecutors allege that technology was misappropriated from six U.S. companies, including router source code and manuals, antenna technology and robot-testing technology. If proven, that is a direct intellectual-property issue. But the case also alleges business with Iran through Skycom, misleading statements to a financial institution and business in North Korea. Those theories connect the legal case to the costs of operating across incompatible sanctions and disclosure systems.

Ann Tofado:

That combination also explains why the case carries political weight. Washington has an incentive to show that its concerns about a powerful foreign technology company can be pursued through ordinary criminal law, not only through executive restrictions or import bans. Beijing has the opposite incentive: to describe the prosecution as economic bullying and national security used as a pretext against a flagship Chinese company. But those political narratives do not answer the jury’s question.

Red Velhouse:

Let’s make that jury question precise. What must prosecutors prove for this to become a racketeering conviction rather than a series of troubling but separate allegations?

Sam Dewinski:

They must establish the elements of the charged offenses and the continuing enterprise and pattern required by the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, commonly called RICO. The government will try to connect alleged trade-secret theft, sanctions-related conduct and financial misrepresentations through a common organization and repeated methods. The defense will argue that the enterprise label improperly combines conduct that should be evaluated separately. The jury is not deciding whether Huawei is geopolitically threatening; it is deciding whether each charge is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Kate Burvish:

That separation matters economically as much as legally. A conviction could raise compliance, financing and litigation costs for Huawei and its counterparties. But an acquittal would not erase the commercial value of any trade secrets, nor would it prove that every allegation was false. It could, however, strengthen the argument that the United States stretched criminal law into a geopolitical and commercial conflict. Either outcome changes perceptions of legal risk, even if market access does not change immediately.

Red Velhouse:

The government also has evidence that could help it connect the financial theory to Huawei’s leadership: the statement by former chief financial officer Meng Wanzhou. Ann, what exactly did the judge allow, and what does it not establish?

Ann Tofado:

In 2021, Meng entered a deferred-prosecution agreement and acknowledged making material misrepresentations to a financial institution while serving as Huawei’s chief financial officer. In June 2026, Judge Ann Donnelly ruled that her statement of facts could be used against Huawei at trial. That resolves the admissibility issue addressed by the ruling, not the weight the jury must give the statement or Huawei’s ultimate guilt. The defense can still argue about what the statement proves and how it relates to the broader case.

Sam Dewinski:

The history matters here. Meng’s 2018 arrest in Canada became a major diplomatic crisis involving Washington, Beijing and Ottawa. Her U.S. charges ended through the deferred-prosecution agreement, the withdrawal of the extradition request and her return to China; the corporate case continued. The simultaneous release of two Canadians in China was widely viewed as part of a broader diplomatic settlement, but Meng’s legal resolution came through the agreement with the United States. That is why the corporate prosecution remains separate from the episode that first brought the case to international attention.

Red Velhouse:

Kate, does Meng’s statement make this principally a fraud case, or does the trade-secret theory remain economically central?

Kate Burvish:

It can be both, but the economic logic is different. The alleged misappropriation claims concern competitive advantage: obtaining technology that could reduce research costs or speed market entry. The alleged financial conduct concerns access to banking and international business despite sanctions exposure. Evidence that helps the government on the financial theory does not automatically prove the trade-secret allegations. The jury may have to separate the value of particular technologies from the corporate representations made about affiliates and foreign operations.

Ann Tofado:

And that distinction is essential because the criminal case is often discussed alongside the national-security debate over Huawei equipment. The Federal Communications Commission’s Covered List bars authorization of covered Huawei telecommunications equipment and services on national-security grounds. But that is a regulatory risk determination, not a criminal conviction. Evidence sufficient for an administrative restriction does not automatically establish fraud, theft or racketeering beyond a reasonable doubt.

Red Velhouse:

That gives us two tracks: specific alleged crimes, and a separate policy judgment about security risk. Sam, how did those tracks come together historically, and where can the analogy mislead us?

Sam Dewinski:

The useful historical context is the expansion of corporate criminal law into complex networks. RICO was associated historically with organized crime, but its enterprise-and-pattern framework can also be invoked in corporate cases involving repeated predicate offenses. The misleading analogy would be to treat Huawei as guilty because it resembles a strategic rival or because regulators distrust its equipment. The legal question is narrower: whether the alleged conduct forms the charged pattern and satisfies the elements of the offenses.

Kate Burvish:

The policy response has also developed on a separate track. The United States placed Huawei and numerous affiliates on the Commerce Department’s Entity List beginning in 2019, imposing licensing requirements on covered exports, reexports and transfers. Those controls raise Huawei’s costs by restricting access to advanced chips, software and manufacturing inputs. But they also create incentives for Huawei and Chinese suppliers to develop substitutes. So pressure on the company can coexist with faster technological decoupling.

Red Velhouse:

And Huawei has not disappeared. Kate, what does the company’s own reporting show about resilience—and what should we avoid inferring from those figures?

Kate Burvish:

Huawei reported 2025 revenue of 880.9 billion yuan, net profit of 68.0 billion yuan and research-and-development spending of 192.3 billion yuan, or 21.8 percent of revenue. Those are company-reported figures. They demonstrate scale and claimed investment, but they do not independently resolve how effective U.S. controls are. Much of the revenue is concentrated in China, which reduces the immediate effect of losing access to U.S. consumer and telecommunications markets. The broader lesson is that restrictions can impose real costs while strengthening incentives to build a domestic ecosystem.

Ann Tofado:

That resilience creates a political dilemma for Washington. A conviction could reinforce deterrence toward other foreign technology companies using affiliates or intermediaries. But an acquittal or limited verdict could lead critics to say the United States overreached. At the same time, an acquittal would not automatically remove Entity List restrictions or the FCC’s Covered List designation. Those measures rest on separate administrative and national-security authorities, so the legal and policy tracks could diverge sharply.

Red Velhouse:

So what should governments and audiences avoid concluding too quickly from the verdict?

Ann Tofado:

They should avoid treating a verdict on alleged fraud or trade-secret theft as a universal finding about every Huawei product. Conversely, they should avoid treating a regulatory security designation as proof that the criminal charges must be true. The trial may affect allied governments deciding how much to trust U.S. claims, but its formal judgment will concern the charged conduct and the evidence presented. Politically, the case tests U.S. credibility precisely because national-security policy and criminal enforcement have become so intertwined.

Sam Dewinski:

And the long delay will shape that credibility too. A careful process can show that a complex multinational case received serious judicial scrutiny. But it can also make accountability seem remote, especially when the alleged conduct is historical and some evidence remains difficult for outsiders to assess because of sensitive-material disputes. The trial will be watched not only for the verdict, but for whether jurors can evaluate a sprawling theory without allowing the broader U.S.-China conflict to substitute for proof.

Red Velhouse:

As jury selection begins, then, the immediate questions are practical: what counts and defendants remain in the case, what evidence reaches the jury, and whether the alleged enterprise can be shown as one pattern rather than several disconnected episodes. Kate, one last economic question: would a conviction deter other foreign technology firms?

Kate Burvish:

It could increase the expected cost of using opaque affiliates, misrepresenting relationships with sanctioned jurisdictions or taking disputed technology. But deterrence is not guaranteed. Firms may respond with stronger compliance, or they may reorganize supply chains and reduce exposure to U.S. markets. The likely second-order effect is deeper separation between American and Chinese technology ecosystems. That can protect intellectual property and restrict sensitive inputs, while also making global production less efficient and diplomacy more difficult.

Red Velhouse:

The unresolved issue is whether prosecutors can prove a coordinated criminal enterprise and each charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt, while keeping that question separate from the broader judgment that Huawei poses a national-security risk. Watch the final defendant and count list, jury instructions, the presentation of Meng Wanzhou’s statement, rulings on sensitive evidence, trade-secret testimony and, eventually, whether the verdict is broad or limited. The trial may clarify the legal case without settling the larger technology rivalry.

Sources and references for this discussion are
available with the episode at Factolio.com.

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Sources and References

These sources supported the factual material used in this discussion. Factolio’s panel discussion is AI-generated from researched evidence and is written in original language.

1. Associated Press — China’s Huawei Technologies faces racketeering trial in New York (NEWS)
2. U.S. Department of Justice, Eastern District of New York — Chinese Telecommunications Conglomerate Huawei and Subsidiaries Charged in Racketeering Conspiracy and Conspiracy to Steal Trade Secrets (PRIMARY)
3. U.S. Department of Justice — Huawei et al. Superseding Indictment, January 2019 (PRIMARY)
4. Reuters — Huawei CFO’s admissions can be used against company at criminal trial, US judge rules (NEWS)
5. U.S. Department of Justice — Huawei CFO Wanzhou Meng Admits to Misleading Global Financial Institution (PRIMARY)
6. U.S. Department of Justice — United States v. Meng: Deferred Prosecution Agreement and Statement of Facts (PRIMARY)
7. U.S. Department of Justice — Chinese Telecommunications Conglomerate Huawei and Huawei CFO Wanzhou Meng Charged With Financial Fraud (PRIMARY)
8. Associated Press — US judge says China’s Huawei Technologies must face criminal case for racketeering and other charges (NEWS)
9. Law360 — Huawei’s Long-Awaited NY RICO Trial Moved To Fall (NEWS)
10. U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York — United States v. Huawei Technologies, Memorandum Decision and Order on Suppression Motions, July 21, 2026 (PRIMARY)
11. CaseMine — United States v. Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., June 18, 2026 order (OTHER)
12. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security — Huawei Added to the Entity List (PRIMARY)
13. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security — Addition of Huawei Affiliates to the Entity List (PRIMARY)
14. Federal Communications Commission — Covered List, May 18, 2026 (PRIMARY)
15. Federal Communications Commission — Second Report and Order: Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain (PRIMARY)
16. Huawei — 2025 Annual Report (PRIMARY)
17. Huawei — Huawei Releases 2025 Annual Report: Performance in Line with Forecast (PRIMARY)
18. Midpage — United States v. Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., case materials and RICO analysis (ANALYSIS)