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Discussion

Red Velhouse:

Ann, start with the immediate event. What exactly did Burhan reject, and what does his statement commit the army to?

Ann Tofado:

He rejected negotiations with the Rapid Support Forces, or RSF, and said the military campaign would continue until the group was removed from Sudan. He also presented the goal as retaking all territory held by the RSF, including areas across Darfur, Kordofan, and Blue Nile. That is more than a battlefield declaration. It defines the army-aligned authorities as the only legitimate national state and treats the RSF as an enemy that cannot be an equal political partner.

Red Velhouse:

The timing seems especially important because this came after a senior American envoy met Burhan. Is the rejection a change in diplomacy, or part of the bargaining?

Ann Tofado:

We cannot tell from the statement alone. It may reflect confidence after military gains, pressure from constituencies that reject any deal with the RSF, or an attempt to raise the price of future negotiations. Publicly ruling out talks can also bind a leader politically: once victory is presented as the route to legitimacy, compromise begins to look like surrender. But this establishes Burhan’s position, not necessarily the unanimous view of every military or allied faction, and it does not prove that the army can retake the territory it names.

Sam Dewinski:

That distinction is historically important. In fragmented wars, leaders often describe the conflict as a rebellion that can be eliminated even after the opposing force has become a governing institution. The RSF is not simply moving through empty space. It controls substantial territory in western Sudan and has developed administrative and economic networks. That does not make it legitimate or erase allegations of abuses, but it does make the war harder to end through a single victory.

Red Velhouse:

Sam, does that make the word partition useful here, or does it mislead us?

Sam Dewinski:

It is useful only if we define it carefully. Sudan’s current war follows an interrupted transition: the 2019 uprising removed Omar al-Bashir, a civilian-military arrangement followed, and the 2021 coup dismantled that partnership before war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF began in 2023. This is not a conventional rebellion against a stable state. It is a struggle between rival armed institutions over the state itself. Darfur’s history also shows how forces that begin as security auxiliaries can become durable political and economic actors.

Sam Dewinski:

But a clean, formal partition is the wrong image. Control is fluid: a group may hold a city, a road, rural territory, or an administrative function without controlling everything around it. Today’s conflict also involves extensive drone warfare, external supply networks, parallel institutions, and a severe humanitarian collapse. The danger is therefore not necessarily two neat countries. It may be a nominally unified Sudan governed through rival zones and incompatible authorities.

Kate Burvish:

And that kind of fragmentation has an economic meaning even without a formal border. Different banknote regimes, separate tax collection, competing customs routes, and rival salary systems can make one country operate like several economies. Reuters reported that newly issued Sudanese pound notes were circulating in RSF-controlled areas, alongside efforts by the RSF’s parallel administration to perform functions such as paying civil servants. Those developments raise transaction costs and make future reunification more difficult.

Red Velhouse:

So the political map and the economic map may be separating at the same time. Kate, why would armed actors keep fighting when the national economy is suffering contractions of about 29.4 percent in 2023 and 14 percent in 2024?

Kate Burvish:

Because national economic collapse and elite war incentives can coexist. The war has damaged agriculture, trade, industry, banking, transport, and public services, but some revenue streams remain available to armed networks. Gold is especially important: official production was reported at 70 tons in 2025, up from 64 tons in 2024, although official figures may miss smuggling. Gold can finance weapons and patronage. It cannot rebuild a national economy, but it can make continued territorial control financially viable for the people who benefit from it.

Ann Tofado:

That is the political trap. Each side can claim to be defending Sudan while building institutions that make a unified Sudan less likely. The army-aligned authorities retain formal state institutions and important population centers in the east and center. The RSF has territorial depth in the west and its own administrative ambitions. Military gains may strengthen one side’s bargaining position, but they do not automatically restore civilian legitimacy or a shared political order.

Red Velhouse:

Let’s connect that institutional question to the human consequences. What does rejecting negotiations mean for people beyond the diplomatic language?

Kate Burvish:

It means the costs of waiting are being pushed downward. On October 6, at least 10 civilians were reported killed in an RSF attack in West Kordofan, and clashes in Blue Nile reportedly displaced about 5,500 people. Those are attributed reports, not fully verified totals. More broadly, the World Health Organization said more than 5.6 million people were displaced across Darfur, with Tawila hosting more than 700,000. Displacement removes people from farms, jobs, schools, and local markets, so the economic damage compounds over time.

Sam Dewinski:

And displacement can become politically self-reinforcing. When populations move repeatedly, local authority changes, property claims become contested, and armed groups gain influence over access to food and return. A later peace agreement then faces not only a military question but a social-geography question: who can safely go home, under whose administration, and with what guarantees? That is why ‘retake the territory’ leaves out the harder problem of governing it afterward.

Red Velhouse:

Ann, can humanitarian diplomacy still work if political negotiations are rejected?

Ann Tofado:

Possibly, but the separation is fragile. A humanitarian truce does not require the parties to agree on Sudan’s constitutional future. In principle, they can negotiate aid corridors, prisoner exchanges, or pauses without recognizing one another as equal political authorities. The United States’ stated framework links an immediate humanitarian truce to inclusive Sudanese-led dialogue and, eventually, civilian-led government. But access itself is political: whoever controls a road, border crossing, or city can use humanitarian permission as leverage.

Ann Tofado:

There is also a legitimacy dilemma. If outside actors exclude the RSF entirely, they may have no practical route to a ceasefire. If they treat it as an equal political actor, they risk rewarding territorial seizure and abuses. Engaging Burhan is unavoidable because his authorities control much of the formal state apparatus. Engaging the RSF may be unavoidable because it controls territory. Neither form of engagement is the same as endorsement, but that distinction is politically difficult to maintain.

Red Velhouse:

Sam, repeated mediation failures can produce two opposite conclusions: that diplomacy is irrelevant, or that the diplomacy has been poorly designed. Which is more accurate?

Sam Dewinski:

Neither conclusion is sufficient. Earlier efforts, including the Jeddah process and later initiatives, produced commitments or proposals without a durable nationwide ceasefire. That shows that signatures do not overcome incompatible incentives. But failed mediation can still clarify what a workable settlement would require: pressure on external supply networks, guarantees for armed actors who fear exclusion, and a credible civilian role. Mediation has to change the calculations sustaining the war; it cannot simply be a ceremony held after the fighting ends.

Kate Burvish:

The funding environment makes that challenge harder. The United Nations’ 2026 humanitarian plan sought about 2.87 billion dollars and had received just over 40 percent by late August. The regional refugee response plan was only 17 percent funded against a 1.59-billion-dollar requirement. The World Health Organization reported receiving about 22 million of the 97.7 million dollars requested for its Sudan health response. Those gaps tell civilians that outside support is limited, and they tell armed actors that they may be able to fill the vacuum with salaries, food, or security.

Red Velhouse:

So underfunding is not only a moral failure; it can alter the balance of power. What should audiences understand about the food situation and its uncertainty?

Kate Burvish:

The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, or IPC, estimated in May that 19.5 million people—about 41 percent of Sudan’s population—were facing crisis-level food insecurity or worse. More than 5 million were in the Emergency category, and about 135,000 were in Catastrophe conditions. The IPC also identified a risk of famine in 14 areas under conditions of intensified conflict and restricted access. ‘Risk of famine’ is a projection under specified conditions, not a claim that famine is uniform across Sudan. But it shows how quickly military strategy can become a food-security strategy.

Ann Tofado:

And that is why Burhan’s position matters even if the army never achieves its stated objective. A strategy of total victory can narrow the political space, prolong access restrictions, and deepen the legitimacy crisis. The army may believe that controlling more territory will make it the indispensable government. Yet if civilian groups remain fragmented and armed actors retain veto power, territorial gains may produce a stronger military administration rather than a credible civilian transition.

Red Velhouse:

What would show that the conflict is moving toward a settlement rather than deeper de facto partition?

Sam Dewinski:

Watch the political vocabulary as much as the map. If both sides move from maximal claims—total victory and permanent exclusion—toward arrangements for access, local administration, and civilian participation, that would matter. Also watch whether indirect channels reopen. Burhan’s statement may close them, or it may be a public position intended to improve leverage before future talks. We do not yet know which.

Kate Burvish:

Economically, watch the currency and the flow of public salaries, customs revenue, and gold. Further separation in banknotes or taxation would suggest that parallel governance is becoming durable. On the humanitarian side, donor funding, access through the Adre crossing from Chad, and health-service financing are practical indicators. If those improve, civilians may gain room to survive independently of armed authorities. If they deteriorate, the war economy becomes even more powerful.

Ann Tofado:

And watch external leverage. The conflict is sustained not only by Sudanese decisions but by weapons, mercenaries, gold networks, and regional competition. International actors have to decide whether engagement will merely manage access or impose costs that change military calculations. A civilian-led transition cannot be credible if civilians are invited into talks while armed groups retain the ability to veto every outcome.

Red Velhouse:

Sudan’s unresolved question is not simply whether the army can gain ground. It is whether military gains can rebuild a legitimate, unified state—or instead leave rival armed administrations, currencies, and revenue systems entrenched across the country. Watch the front lines, humanitarian access, donor funding, currency measures, external support networks, and any return to indirect talks. Those signals will show whether Sudan is moving toward a difficult political settlement or a deeper, de facto partition. Sources and references for this discussion are
available with the episode at Factolio.com.

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Sources and References

These sources supported the factual material used in this discussion. Factolio’s panel discussion is AI-generated from researched evidence and is written in original language.

1. Associated Press — US envoy holds rare meeting with Sudan’s top general in push to seek end to fighting (NEWS)
2. Al Jazeera — Sudan’s al-Burhan rejects talks, vows to retake all territory from RSF (NEWS)
3. Anadolu Agency — Sudan’s Burhan vows to continue military campaign until ‘every inch’ retaken (NEWS)
4. Sudan Tribune — Sudan army chief rules out talks with paramilitary RSF (NEWS)
5. Reuters, republished by Internazionale — New Sudanese notes circulate in RSF areas, deepening de facto split (NEWS)
6. UK Government — Country policy and information note: security situation, Sudan, July 2026 (PRIMARY)
7. Associated Press — US envoy holds rare meeting with Sudan’s top general in push to seek end to fighting (NEWS)
8. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs — Briefing to the Security Council on the humanitarian situation in Sudan, 24 August 2026 (PRIMARY)
9. United Nations Office at Geneva — UN Geneva Press Briefing, September 2026 (PRIMARY)
10. United Nations Office at Geneva — UN Geneva Press Briefing, October 6, 2026 (PRIMARY)
11. UK Government — Country policy and information note: humanitarian situation, Sudan, September 2026 (PRIMARY)
12. World Bank — Sudan country overview (DATA)
13. Integrated Food Security Phase Classification — Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation and Projections for 2026 (DATA)
14. UK Government — Country policy and information note: humanitarian situation, Sudan, September 2026 (PRIMARY)
15. World Bank — Sudan country overview (DATA)
16. Reuters, republished by AOL — New Sudanese notes circulate in RSF areas, deepening de facto split (NEWS)
17. Reuters, republished by Marketscreener — New Sudanese notes circulate in RSF areas, deepening de facto split (NEWS)
18. Associated Press — In Sudan’s war economy, gold keeps flowing as miners risk mercury and collapse (NEWS)
19. Bertelsmann Stiftung — BTI 2026 Country Report: Sudan (ANALYSIS)
20. Congressional Research Service — Sudan’s Uncertain Transition (ANALYSIS)
21. International IDEA — Options to Form a Transitional Government in Wartime in Sudan (ANALYSIS)
22. UK Government — Country policy and information note: humanitarian situation, Sudan, September 2026 (PRIMARY)