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Discussion

Sam Dewinski:

The SCO is a broad intergovernmental organisation founded in 2001 by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It now has ten members: China, Russia, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and Belarus. Its agenda covers diplomacy, security, counterterrorism, transport, energy, trade, education and culture. The Secretariat is in Beijing, while its Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, or RATS, is in Tashkent. It is therefore a significant Eurasian forum, but not an eastern version of NATO.

Ann Tofado:

The SCO’s charter describes it as open, non-bloc and not directed against other states or organisations. Its principles emphasise sovereignty, non-interference, non-aggression, consultation and opposition to ideological confrontation. Yet it also conducts security cooperation. RATS supports information exchange and coordination against terrorism, separatism and extremism, and members hold joint exercises. So the SCO is not a defence alliance, but it is more than a discussion club.

Red Velhouse:

How would that kind of membership differ from Turkey’s existing Western relationships?

Sam Dewinski:

NATO is a military and political alliance organised around collective defence. Under Article 5, an armed attack on one ally is treated as an attack on all, and allies commit to assist. NATO also has integrated planning, command structures and military interoperability. The SCO has no equivalent guarantee. Its decisions are reached by agreement and implemented through national laws and procedures. A Turkish seat in the SCO could expand diplomatic and security contacts, but it would not duplicate NATO protection.

Kate Burvish:

The European Union represents a different commitment again. It is a legally integrated political and economic union with common institutions, a single market and a common trade policy. Turkey is not an EU member, but its customs union with the EU, in force since 1996, removes tariffs and quantitative restrictions for covered industrial goods and requires alignment in areas such as competition, intellectual property and technical rules. The SCO offers no comparable customs union, common external tariff, single market or automatic free-trade area.

Red Velhouse:

Turkey has been an SCO dialogue partner since 2012. What would full membership add?

Ann Tofado:

The immediate gain would be formal access. Turkey could participate in member-only councils and consultations involving China, Russia, India, Iran, Pakistan and Central Asian governments, rather than relying mainly on invitations as a dialogue partner. That would give Ankara more opportunity to shape agendas on transport, energy security, migration and counterterrorism. Politically, it would reinforce Erdoğan’s presentation of Turkey as an independent power able to speak with Washington and Brussels while maintaining channels to Moscow, Beijing and other Eurasian capitals.

Sam Dewinski:

There could also be more regular contact among security agencies, border authorities and counterterrorism institutions. RATS-related discussions and exercises could improve cooperation against terrorism, trafficking, narcotics and irregular migration. But these mechanisms would not guarantee protection against an external attack. They could also create sensitivities if Turkish intelligence, extradition or designation practices diverged from those of NATO and European partners.

Red Velhouse:

So the political value is access and manoeuvring room, while the security value is coordination rather than an alliance guarantee. Kate, what is the economic case?

Kate Burvish:

It is mainly project-based. Full membership could help Turkey promote the Middle Corridor, the transport network linking China and Central Asia across the Caspian and South Caucasus, through Turkey and onward to Europe. Ankara could seek investment in rail, ports, logistics, customs infrastructure and energy connections, along with tourism, industrial partnerships and financing. But membership itself would not give Turkish exporters tariff-free access to SCO markets. Commercial gains would depend on separate agreements, projects and investment decisions.

Kate Burvish:

The existing numbers explain why this would supplement, not replace, Europe. EU-Turkey goods trade exceeded 217.6 billion euros in 2025, with the EU accounting for 42.7 percent of Turkish goods exports and 35.3 percent of imports. By contrast, Turkey exported about 4.5 billion dollars in goods to China while importing 48.4 billion. Russia is important for energy, tourism, nuclear construction and trade, but those ties also create dependence. Eastern partnerships may diversify Ankara’s options; they do not currently replace Europe’s structural role.

Sam Dewinski:

Akkuyu illustrates the calculation. Russia’s Rosatom is building Turkey’s nuclear plant, with initial electricity generation targeted for 2026, and Erdoğan has discussed additional Russian-backed projects. These ties can support energy planning and economic activity, but they also involve Russian financing, technology and operational participation over decades. A closer SCO relationship could create another setting for cooperation while increasing Western concern about dependence and sanctions exposure.

Red Velhouse:

What would Turkey actually have to do to join?

Sam Dewinski:

The process is staged. Turkey would submit an official request signed by its head of state. The Council of National Coordinators and foreign ministers would review it, and the Council of Heads of State would have to agree by consensus to begin admission. Turkey would then negotiate a Memorandum of Commitments. That document would specify the SCO treaties and instruments it would join, the timetable, its budget contribution and personnel quota in the permanent bodies. Those details are negotiated, not automatic.

Ann Tofado:

Turkey would have to comply with the Charter and the instruments listed in the memorandum, pay the agreed contribution, provide institutional personnel and implement commitments through its own laws and procedures. Before final approval, it would notify the secretary-general that the memorandum had been implemented. This would not create a supranational authority over Turkey: SCO decisions are adopted by agreement without a formal vote, and implementation remains under national control.

Kate Burvish:

The criteria include diplomatic relations with every SCO member, active economic and humanitarian relations, no armed conflict with another state, no United Nations Security Council sanctions and security commitments that do not conflict with SCO treaties and instruments. Turkey appears to meet several conditions, including dialogue-partner status and diplomatic relations with SCO states. Whether it satisfies all of them would be a political judgment by the members. The security-commitments requirement matters because Turkey is already in NATO.

Red Velhouse:

The documents do not automatically prohibit NATO membership. Could the relationships still pull Turkey in different directions?

Ann Tofado:

Yes, although not automatically. The SCO Charter says membership does not affect rights and obligations under other international treaties. Full SCO membership would therefore not, by itself, require Turkey to leave NATO or end its EU customs-union relationship. The issue would be conduct. If SCO commitments led Ankara to restrict intelligence sharing, defence exercises, technology transfers or military coordination with NATO members, practical tensions would follow. Similar friction could arise over security issues involving Russia, China, Iran or Central Asia.

Kate Burvish:

The sharpest European tension would likely involve sanctions and trade. Turkey is not required, simply because it is an EU candidate, to adopt every EU restrictive measure automatically. But the EU expects candidate countries progressively to align with EU foreign-policy positions and sanctions, and it has raised concerns about Turkey’s non-alignment with Russia sanctions and possible circumvention through trade. SCO membership would not require Turkey to reject Western sanctions, but closer ties with Russia, China or Iran could make alignment more difficult and expose Turkish companies to greater scrutiny.

Sam Dewinski:

The historical context points to continuity as well as change. Turkey joined NATO in 1952 and remains an active member. Its European integration includes an association agreement dating to 1963 and the customs union from 1996. The current SCO discussion also follows Turkey’s decision to become a dialogue partner in 2012. Attending a summit, or expressing interest in membership, does not switch those commitments off. Erdoğan’s stated position is that Turkey can remain inside NATO while widening its options elsewhere.

Red Velhouse:

Could SCO membership strengthen Turkey’s role in the Black Sea, where Erdoğan has called for a permanent mechanism protecting commercial shipping?

Ann Tofado:

It could give Turkey another forum and more channels to major Eurasian governments, but it would not make a shipping agreement happen. Turkey helped broker the 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative, and control of the Turkish Straits gives Ankara unusual leverage. A durable mechanism would still require Russia, Ukraine and other maritime actors to agree on rules, monitoring and enforcement. The earlier arrangement ended when Russia left it in 2023. Erdoğan’s call is a diplomatic objective, not an established SCO security regime.

Kate Burvish:

The economic trade-off is similar. A safer Black Sea could reduce insurance and transit risks, while better Middle Corridor infrastructure could increase transit revenue and Turkey’s role as a logistics hub. Chinese financing might accelerate projects, but could also deepen dependence on Chinese capital and technology. Energy cooperation with Russia carries a comparable vulnerability. The test is whether these relationships diversify Turkey’s options or create new forms of dependence.

Red Velhouse:

How should observers distinguish strategic autonomy from genuine realignment?

Sam Dewinski:

Start with the legal process: a formal accession request and an actual admission process would matter more than another presidential statement. Then examine the Memorandum of Commitments, the treaties Turkey agrees to join, its timetable and its financial and personnel commitments.

Kate Burvish:

Track the money as well: Chinese financing and Turkish exports linked to the Middle Corridor, new Russian nuclear agreements, trade balances and sanctions disputes. If these projects expand Turkish production, connectivity and energy diversification, the gains could be substantial. If they mainly increase deficits or dependence, membership will have delivered political access more than economic independence.

Ann Tofado:

Finally, watch behaviour inside NATO and toward the EU. Sustained SCO security exercises, expanded RATS cooperation, new defence-industrial arrangements with SCO members, restrictions on NATO information-sharing or deliberate changes to sanctions cooperation would be stronger evidence of realignment than summit rhetoric. For now, the evidence supports multi-alignment: Turkey is seeking more room to manoeuvre without announcing a Western exit.

Red Velhouse:

The SCO is neither NATO’s collective-defence alliance nor the European Union’s legally integrated economic and political system. For Turkey, full membership could offer a wider Eurasian diplomatic platform, security contacts and project-based opportunities in transport, energy, investment and trade. It would also require negotiated commitments involving SCO treaties, budget contributions, personnel and implementation, while creating practical tensions over intelligence, defence cooperation, sanctions and trade with Western partners. Turkey has not announced an alliance switch. The decisive evidence will be a formal application, the commitments it negotiates and whether its policies preserve or weaken its NATO and European relationships. Sources and references for this discussion are available with the episode at Factolio.com.

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Sources and References

These sources supported the factual material used in this discussion. Factolio’s panel discussion is AI-generated from researched evidence and is written in original language.

1. Associated Press — Turkey’s relations with Russia, China don’t mean turning its back on the West, Erdogan says (NEWS)
2. Republic of Türkiye Directorate of Communications — President Erdoğan answers journalists’ questions on his return flight from Kyrgyzstan (PRIMARY)
3. Reuters — Erdogan says Turkey would consider full membership of China- and Russia-led security bloc (NEWS)
4. Republic of Türkiye Directorate of Communications — Erdoğan: Şanghay İşbirliği Örgütü ile iş birliğimizi her alanda geliştirmeye gayret edeceğiz (PRIMARY)
5. Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs — Shanghai Cooperation Organization (PRIMARY)
6. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation — Statement by the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (PRIMARY)
7. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation — Answers to the questions of the video conference ‘SCO – Shaping Eurasia’ (PRIMARY)
8. Republic of Türkiye Directorate of Communications — Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’ın, Rusya Devlet Başkanı Putin ile görüşmesine ilişkin açıklama (PRIMARY)
9. Reuters Connect — Erdogan says Türkiye-Russia ties at most advanced level during Putin meeting (NEWS)
10. Associated Press — Turkey’s Erdogan signals further nuclear projects with Russia (NEWS)
11. Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources — Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant — 2026 electricity-generation target (PRIMARY)
12. Government of the Russian Federation — 19th meeting of the Russian-Turkish Joint Intergovernmental Commission (PRIMARY)
13. Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Trade — Turkey-Russia relations are important in energy (PRIMARY)
14. Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs — Türkiye-People’s Republic of China Economic and Trade Relations (PRIMARY)
15. Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs — Türkiye’s Connectivity and Multilateral Transportation Policy (PRIMARY)
16. Türkiye Presidential Investment Office — President Erdoğan Meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Tianjin (PRIMARY)
17. NATO — NATO member countries (PRIMARY)
18. NATO — 2026 NATO Summit in Ankara (PRIMARY)
19. Council of the European Union — Türkiye (PRIMARY)
20. European External Action Service — The European Union and Türkiye (PRIMARY)
21. European Commission Directorate-General for Trade — EU trade relations with Türkiye (DATA)
22. European Commission — Türkiye 2025 Report (ANALYSIS)
23. CSIS — Turkey and the World: Between Alignment and Strategic Autonomy (ANALYSIS)
24. World Bank — Turkey Country Climate and Development Report (DATA)
25. Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs — Turkey accepted as an SCO dialogue partner (PRIMARY)
26. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation — About Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (PRIMARY)
27. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation — Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (PRIMARY)
28. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation — About SCO (PRIMARY)
29. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation — Regulation on Admission of New Members to Shanghai Cooperation Organization (PRIMARY)
30. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation — SCO agenda is an agenda for region-wide development (PRIMARY)
31. NATO — Consensus decision-making at NATO (PRIMARY)
32. NATO — Collective defence and Article 5 (PRIMARY)
33. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation — Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the SCO (PRIMARY)
34. EUR-Lex — Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (PRIMARY)
35. European External Action Service — EU-Türkiye Customs Union (PRIMARY)